11/22/21, 3:35 PM
Preview Rubric: Course Assignment Rubric (3 criteria) (4 levels)(60pts) – 4WI2021 Legal Environment of Business (BUS-225-01…
Course Assignment Rubric (3 criteria) (4 levels)
(60pts)
Course: 4WI2021 Legal Environment of Business (BUS-225-01A)
Criteria
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Criterion Score
Content
30 points
25 points
20 points
15 points
/ 30
(26–30 points)
(21–25 points)
(16–20 points)
(0–15 points)
You address
some of the
assignment
requirements.
You address few
or none of the
assignment
requirements.
You display good
organization.
You do not
effectively
organize content.
You address all of You address
the assignment
most of the
requirements.
assignment
requirements.
You display
excellent
You display very
organization.
good
organization.
You correctly use
and cite your
You correctly use
sources in your
and cite some
answer.
sources.
You do not use
or cite all sources
correctly.
You do not use
or cite sources
correctly.
https://brightspace.indwes.edu/d2l/lp/rubrics/preview.d2l?ou=155140&rubricId=473419&originTool=quicklinks
1/3
11/22/21, 3:35 PM
Preview Rubric: Course Assignment Rubric (3 criteria) (4 levels)(60pts) – 4WI2021 Legal Environment of Business (BUS-225-01…
Criteria
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Criterion Score
Critical
Thinking
20 points
15 points
10 points
5 points
/ 20
(16–20 points)
(11–15 points)
(6–10 points)
(0–5 points)
You demonstrate
clear, insightful
critical thinking.
You demonstrate
competent
critical thinking.
You demonstrate
limited critical
thinking.
You demonstrate
little to no
critical thinking.
You examine key
issues, scrutinize
the meaning of
the information,
and apply
relevant criteria
to the problem
or issue.
You describe key
issues, the
content of the
source materials,
and the meaning
of the
information, and
you define the
criteria and
reasoning used
to make
judgments.
You mention key
issues, record the
content found in
the source
materials,
identify potential
meanings of the
information, and
identify criteria
used to make
judgments.
You fail to raise
key issues, miss
key source
materials, ignore
or misrepresent
the meaning of
the information,
and do not use
criteria—or use
invalid criteria—
to make
judgments.
10 points
7 points
4 points
2 points
(8–10 points)
(5–7 points)
(3–4 points)
(0–2 points)
Your sentence
structure is
complete, with
correct spelling,
punctuation, and
capitalization and
varied diction
and word choice.
Your sentence
structure has
minor errors
(fragments, runons), with correct
spelling,
punctuation, and
capitalization but
limited diction
and word choice.
Your sentence
structure has
several errors in
sentence fluency,
with multiple
fragments/runons and poor
spelling,
punctuation,
and/or word
choice.
Your sentence
structure has
serious and
persistent errors
in sentence
fluency, spelling,
punctuation,
and/or word
choice.
Grammar,
Spelling,
Length, and
Citation
Your assignment
length is correct,
with correct APA
formatting.
Total
Your assignment
length is correct,
with correct APA
formatting.
Your assignment
length is
inadequate, with
several APA
errors.
/ 10
Your assignment
length is
inadequate, with
several APA
errors.
https://brightspace.indwes.edu/d2l/lp/rubrics/preview.d2l?ou=155140&rubricId=473419&originTool=quicklinks
2/3
11/22/21, 3:35 PM
Preview Rubric: Course Assignment Rubric (3 criteria) (4 levels)(60pts) – 4WI2021 Legal Environment of Business (BUS-225-01…
Total
/ 60
Overall Score
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
60 points minimum
48 points minimum
36 points minimum
0 points minimum
https://brightspace.indwes.edu/d2l/lp/rubrics/preview.d2l?ou=155140&rubricId=473419&originTool=quicklinks
3/3
BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL. v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES,
INC.,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the “Government [from] substantially burden[ing]
a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the
Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
42 U. S. C. §§2000bb–1(a), (b). As amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), RFRA covers “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.” §2000cc–5(7)(A).
At issue here are regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), which, as relevant here, requires specified employers’ group
health plans to furnish “preventive care and screenings” for women without “any cost sharing requirements,”42 U.
S. C. §300gg–13(a)(4). Congress did not specify what types of preventive care must be covered; it authorized the
Health Resources and Services Administration, a component of HHS, to decide. Nonexempt employers are
generally required to provide coverage for the 20 contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug Administration, including the 4 that may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg from developing any
further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus. Religious employers, such as churches, are exempt from this
contraceptive mandate. HHS has also effectively exempted religious nonprofit organizations with religious
objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services. Under this accommodation, the insurance issuer must
exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer’s plan and provide plan participants with separate payments
for contraceptive services without imposing any cost sharing requirements on the employer, its insurance plan, or
its employee beneficiaries.
In these cases, the owners of three closely held for-profit corporations have sincere Christian beliefs that life begins at
conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after
that point. In separate actions, they sued HHS and other federal officials and agencies (collectively HHS) under RFRA and
the Free Exercise Clause, seeking to enjoin application of the contraceptive mandate insofar as it requires them to provide
health coverage for the four objectionable contraceptives.
As applied to closely held corporations, the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA.
(a) RFRA applies to regulations that govern the activities of closely held for-profit corporations like Conestoga, Hobby
Lobby, and Mardel.
(1) HHS argues that the companies cannot sue because they are for-profit corporations, and that the owners cannot sue
because the regulations apply only to the companies, but that would leave merchants with a difficult choice: give up the
right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits of operating as corporations. RFRA’s text
shows that Congress designed the statute to provide very broad protection for religious liberty and did not intend to put
merchants to such a choice. It employed the familiar legal fiction of including corporations within RFRA’s definition of
“persons,” but the purpose of extending rights to corporations is to protect the rights of people associated with the
corporation, including shareholders, officers, and employees. Protecting the free-exercise rights of closely held
corporations thus protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control them.
(2) HHS and the dissent make several unpersuasive arguments..
(i) Nothing in RFRA suggests a congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition of “person,” which
“include[s] corporations, . . . as well as individuals.” 1 U. S. C. §1. The Court has entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims
brought by nonprofit corporations. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficiente União do Vegetal, 546 U. S. 418. And
HHS’s concession that a nonprofit corporation can be a “person” under RFRA effectively dispatches any argument that the
term does not reach for-profit corporations; no conceivable definition of “person” includes natural persons and nonprofit
corporations, but not for-profit corporations.
(ii) HHS and the dissent nonetheless argue that RFRA does not cover Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel because they
cannot “exercise . . . religion.” They offer no persuasive explanation for this conclusion. The corporate form alone cannot
explain it because RFRA indisputably protects nonprofit corporations. And the profitmaking objective of the corporations
cannot explain it because the Court has entertained the free-exercise claims of individuals who were attempting to make a
profit as retail merchants. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599. Business practices compelled or limited by the tenets of a
religious doctrine fall comfortably within the understanding of the “exercise of religion” that this Court set out in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877. Any suggestion that for-profit corporations
are incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make money flies in the face of modern corporate
law. States, including those in which the plaintiff corporations were incorporated, authorize corporations to pursue any
lawful purpose or business, including the pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners’ religious principles.
***
(3) Finally, HHS contends that Congress could not have wanted RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations because of the
difficulty of ascertaining the “beliefs” of large, publicly traded corporations, but HHS has not pointed to any example of a
publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from
occurring. HHS has also provided no evidence that the purported problem of determining the sincerity of an asserted
religious belief moved Congress to exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA’s protection. That disputes among the
owners of corporations might arise is not a problem unique to this context. State corporate law provides a ready means
for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. Courts will
turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes..
(b) HHS’s contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the exercise of religion.
(1) It requires the Hahns and Greens to engage in conduct that seriously violates their sincere religious belief that life
begins at conception. If they and their companies refuse to provide contraceptive coverage, they face severe economic
consequences: about $475 million per year for Hobby Lobby, $33 million per year for Conestoga, and $15 million per year
for Mardel. And if they drop coverage altogether, they could face penalties of roughly $26 million for Hobby Lobby,$1.8
million for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel.
***
(3) HHS argues that the connection between what the objecting parties must do and the end that they find to be morally
wrong is too attenuated because it is the employee who will choose the coverage and contraceptive method she uses. But
RFRA’s question is whether the mandate imposes a substantial burden on the objecting parties’ ability to conduct
business in accordance with their religious beliefs. The belief of the Hahns and Greens implicates a difficult and important
question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is immoral for a person to perform
an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by
another. It is not for the Court to say that the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs are mistaken or unreasonable. In fact, this
Court considered and rejected a nearly identical argument in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div.,
450 U. S. 707. The Court’s “narrow function . . . is to determine” whether the plaintiffs’ asserted religious belief reflects“ an
honest conviction,” id., at 716, and there is no dispute here that it does. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 689; and Board
of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 248–249, distinguished.
(c) The Court assumes that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is a
compelling governmental interest, but the Government has failed to show that the contraceptive mandate is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.
(1) The Court assumes that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is
compelling within the meaning of RFRA.
(2) The Government has failed to satisfy RFRA’s least restrictive-means standard. HHS has not shown that it lacks other
means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. The Government
could, e.g., assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives to women unable to obtain coverage due to their
employers’ religious objections. Or it could extend the accommodation that HHS has already established for religious
nonprofit organizations to non-profit employers with religious objections to the contraceptive mandate. That
accommodation does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs that providing insurance coverage for the
contraceptives at issue here violates their religion and it still serves HHS’s stated interests.
Questions:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Please provide a summary of the facts of this case. Your summary should include what the Conestoga, Hobby
Lobby, and Mardel companies objected to as part of their religion. Your summary should also include how the
federal government became a party to this case.
What statutory law passed by Congress was at issue in this case?
Which Constitutional law principle(s) were at issue here and what test did the Supreme Court apply? (rational
basis scrutiny?)
How many contraceptives does the federal government require an employer health insurance plan provide and
did the Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel have a company policy forbidding employees from using the four
contraceptives at issue? Did the companies object to providing any form of contraceptives to their employees?
What was the Supreme Courts holding in this case?
What if a business owner studied scientific journals and came to the belief that a baby’s life begins at conception,
or shortly thereafter, and then objected to the provision of the four contraceptives in this case? Would they have
a Constitutional argument they could make in order to protect their conscience if they were an atheist and did
not recognize any form of religion?
Purchase answer to see full
attachment
Preview Rubric: Course Assignment Rubric (3 criteria) (4 levels)(60pts) – 4WI2021 Legal Environment of Business (BUS-225-01…
Course Assignment Rubric (3 criteria) (4 levels)
(60pts)
Course: 4WI2021 Legal Environment of Business (BUS-225-01A)
Criteria
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Criterion Score
Content
30 points
25 points
20 points
15 points
/ 30
(26–30 points)
(21–25 points)
(16–20 points)
(0–15 points)
You address
some of the
assignment
requirements.
You address few
or none of the
assignment
requirements.
You display good
organization.
You do not
effectively
organize content.
You address all of You address
the assignment
most of the
requirements.
assignment
requirements.
You display
excellent
You display very
organization.
good
organization.
You correctly use
and cite your
You correctly use
sources in your
and cite some
answer.
sources.
You do not use
or cite all sources
correctly.
You do not use
or cite sources
correctly.
https://brightspace.indwes.edu/d2l/lp/rubrics/preview.d2l?ou=155140&rubricId=473419&originTool=quicklinks
1/3
11/22/21, 3:35 PM
Preview Rubric: Course Assignment Rubric (3 criteria) (4 levels)(60pts) – 4WI2021 Legal Environment of Business (BUS-225-01…
Criteria
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Criterion Score
Critical
Thinking
20 points
15 points
10 points
5 points
/ 20
(16–20 points)
(11–15 points)
(6–10 points)
(0–5 points)
You demonstrate
clear, insightful
critical thinking.
You demonstrate
competent
critical thinking.
You demonstrate
limited critical
thinking.
You demonstrate
little to no
critical thinking.
You examine key
issues, scrutinize
the meaning of
the information,
and apply
relevant criteria
to the problem
or issue.
You describe key
issues, the
content of the
source materials,
and the meaning
of the
information, and
you define the
criteria and
reasoning used
to make
judgments.
You mention key
issues, record the
content found in
the source
materials,
identify potential
meanings of the
information, and
identify criteria
used to make
judgments.
You fail to raise
key issues, miss
key source
materials, ignore
or misrepresent
the meaning of
the information,
and do not use
criteria—or use
invalid criteria—
to make
judgments.
10 points
7 points
4 points
2 points
(8–10 points)
(5–7 points)
(3–4 points)
(0–2 points)
Your sentence
structure is
complete, with
correct spelling,
punctuation, and
capitalization and
varied diction
and word choice.
Your sentence
structure has
minor errors
(fragments, runons), with correct
spelling,
punctuation, and
capitalization but
limited diction
and word choice.
Your sentence
structure has
several errors in
sentence fluency,
with multiple
fragments/runons and poor
spelling,
punctuation,
and/or word
choice.
Your sentence
structure has
serious and
persistent errors
in sentence
fluency, spelling,
punctuation,
and/or word
choice.
Grammar,
Spelling,
Length, and
Citation
Your assignment
length is correct,
with correct APA
formatting.
Total
Your assignment
length is correct,
with correct APA
formatting.
Your assignment
length is
inadequate, with
several APA
errors.
/ 10
Your assignment
length is
inadequate, with
several APA
errors.
https://brightspace.indwes.edu/d2l/lp/rubrics/preview.d2l?ou=155140&rubricId=473419&originTool=quicklinks
2/3
11/22/21, 3:35 PM
Preview Rubric: Course Assignment Rubric (3 criteria) (4 levels)(60pts) – 4WI2021 Legal Environment of Business (BUS-225-01…
Total
/ 60
Overall Score
Level 4
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
60 points minimum
48 points minimum
36 points minimum
0 points minimum
https://brightspace.indwes.edu/d2l/lp/rubrics/preview.d2l?ou=155140&rubricId=473419&originTool=quicklinks
3/3
BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL. v. HOBBY LOBBY STORES,
INC.,
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the “Government [from] substantially burden[ing]
a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the
Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
42 U. S. C. §§2000bb–1(a), (b). As amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), RFRA covers “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.” §2000cc–5(7)(A).
At issue here are regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), which, as relevant here, requires specified employers’ group
health plans to furnish “preventive care and screenings” for women without “any cost sharing requirements,”42 U.
S. C. §300gg–13(a)(4). Congress did not specify what types of preventive care must be covered; it authorized the
Health Resources and Services Administration, a component of HHS, to decide. Nonexempt employers are
generally required to provide coverage for the 20 contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug Administration, including the 4 that may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg from developing any
further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus. Religious employers, such as churches, are exempt from this
contraceptive mandate. HHS has also effectively exempted religious nonprofit organizations with religious
objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services. Under this accommodation, the insurance issuer must
exclude contraceptive coverage from the employer’s plan and provide plan participants with separate payments
for contraceptive services without imposing any cost sharing requirements on the employer, its insurance plan, or
its employee beneficiaries.
In these cases, the owners of three closely held for-profit corporations have sincere Christian beliefs that life begins at
conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after
that point. In separate actions, they sued HHS and other federal officials and agencies (collectively HHS) under RFRA and
the Free Exercise Clause, seeking to enjoin application of the contraceptive mandate insofar as it requires them to provide
health coverage for the four objectionable contraceptives.
As applied to closely held corporations, the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA.
(a) RFRA applies to regulations that govern the activities of closely held for-profit corporations like Conestoga, Hobby
Lobby, and Mardel.
(1) HHS argues that the companies cannot sue because they are for-profit corporations, and that the owners cannot sue
because the regulations apply only to the companies, but that would leave merchants with a difficult choice: give up the
right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits of operating as corporations. RFRA’s text
shows that Congress designed the statute to provide very broad protection for religious liberty and did not intend to put
merchants to such a choice. It employed the familiar legal fiction of including corporations within RFRA’s definition of
“persons,” but the purpose of extending rights to corporations is to protect the rights of people associated with the
corporation, including shareholders, officers, and employees. Protecting the free-exercise rights of closely held
corporations thus protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control them.
(2) HHS and the dissent make several unpersuasive arguments..
(i) Nothing in RFRA suggests a congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition of “person,” which
“include[s] corporations, . . . as well as individuals.” 1 U. S. C. §1. The Court has entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims
brought by nonprofit corporations. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficiente União do Vegetal, 546 U. S. 418. And
HHS’s concession that a nonprofit corporation can be a “person” under RFRA effectively dispatches any argument that the
term does not reach for-profit corporations; no conceivable definition of “person” includes natural persons and nonprofit
corporations, but not for-profit corporations.
(ii) HHS and the dissent nonetheless argue that RFRA does not cover Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel because they
cannot “exercise . . . religion.” They offer no persuasive explanation for this conclusion. The corporate form alone cannot
explain it because RFRA indisputably protects nonprofit corporations. And the profitmaking objective of the corporations
cannot explain it because the Court has entertained the free-exercise claims of individuals who were attempting to make a
profit as retail merchants. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599. Business practices compelled or limited by the tenets of a
religious doctrine fall comfortably within the understanding of the “exercise of religion” that this Court set out in
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877. Any suggestion that for-profit corporations
are incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make money flies in the face of modern corporate
law. States, including those in which the plaintiff corporations were incorporated, authorize corporations to pursue any
lawful purpose or business, including the pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners’ religious principles.
***
(3) Finally, HHS contends that Congress could not have wanted RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations because of the
difficulty of ascertaining the “beliefs” of large, publicly traded corporations, but HHS has not pointed to any example of a
publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from
occurring. HHS has also provided no evidence that the purported problem of determining the sincerity of an asserted
religious belief moved Congress to exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA’s protection. That disputes among the
owners of corporations might arise is not a problem unique to this context. State corporate law provides a ready means
for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. Courts will
turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes..
(b) HHS’s contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the exercise of religion.
(1) It requires the Hahns and Greens to engage in conduct that seriously violates their sincere religious belief that life
begins at conception. If they and their companies refuse to provide contraceptive coverage, they face severe economic
consequences: about $475 million per year for Hobby Lobby, $33 million per year for Conestoga, and $15 million per year
for Mardel. And if they drop coverage altogether, they could face penalties of roughly $26 million for Hobby Lobby,$1.8
million for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel.
***
(3) HHS argues that the connection between what the objecting parties must do and the end that they find to be morally
wrong is too attenuated because it is the employee who will choose the coverage and contraceptive method she uses. But
RFRA’s question is whether the mandate imposes a substantial burden on the objecting parties’ ability to conduct
business in accordance with their religious beliefs. The belief of the Hahns and Greens implicates a difficult and important
question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is immoral for a person to perform
an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by
another. It is not for the Court to say that the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs are mistaken or unreasonable. In fact, this
Court considered and rejected a nearly identical argument in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div.,
450 U. S. 707. The Court’s “narrow function . . . is to determine” whether the plaintiffs’ asserted religious belief reflects“ an
honest conviction,” id., at 716, and there is no dispute here that it does. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 689; and Board
of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 248–249, distinguished.
(c) The Court assumes that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is a
compelling governmental interest, but the Government has failed to show that the contraceptive mandate is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.
(1) The Court assumes that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is
compelling within the meaning of RFRA.
(2) The Government has failed to satisfy RFRA’s least restrictive-means standard. HHS has not shown that it lacks other
means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. The Government
could, e.g., assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives to women unable to obtain coverage due to their
employers’ religious objections. Or it could extend the accommodation that HHS has already established for religious
nonprofit organizations to non-profit employers with religious objections to the contraceptive mandate. That
accommodation does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs that providing insurance coverage for the
contraceptives at issue here violates their religion and it still serves HHS’s stated interests.
Questions:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Please provide a summary of the facts of this case. Your summary should include what the Conestoga, Hobby
Lobby, and Mardel companies objected to as part of their religion. Your summary should also include how the
federal government became a party to this case.
What statutory law passed by Congress was at issue in this case?
Which Constitutional law principle(s) were at issue here and what test did the Supreme Court apply? (rational
basis scrutiny?)
How many contraceptives does the federal government require an employer health insurance plan provide and
did the Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel have a company policy forbidding employees from using the four
contraceptives at issue? Did the companies object to providing any form of contraceptives to their employees?
What was the Supreme Courts holding in this case?
What if a business owner studied scientific journals and came to the belief that a baby’s life begins at conception,
or shortly thereafter, and then objected to the provision of the four contraceptives in this case? Would they have
a Constitutional argument they could make in order to protect their conscience if they were an atheist and did
not recognize any form of religion?
Purchase answer to see full
attachment
